Corporate Reorganizations Under Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act by Doub, George Cochran
Maryland Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 2
Corporate Reorganizations Under Chapter X of the
National Bankruptcy Act
George Cochran Doub
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
George C. Doub, Corporate Reorganizations Under Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act, 3 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1938)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol3/iss1/2
Maryland Law Review
VOLUME III DECEMBER, 1938 NUMBER 1
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAPTER
X OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
By GEORGE COCHRAN DouB*
The Bankruptcy Act of 1938, known as the Chandler
Act,' has made drastic changes in the procedure for
the reorganization of industrial corporations.' The sec-
tion of the Bankruptcy Act dealing with corporate reor-
ganizations-77BW-under which numerous corporations
have been reorganized since 1934, has been superseded by
Chapter X of the Chandler Act with the result that a com-
prehensive revision of the text and structure of 77B has
been effected.4
The provisions of Chapter X represent principally the
joint work of the National Bankruptcy Conference and the
SEC. The wording of the Act is largely the work of the
drafting committee of the National Bankruptcy Conference
and the procedural changes stem from a study and inves-
tigation of reorganization practices made by the SEC.5
Representatives of the SEC testified before the Senate and
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; A.B., 1924, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B.,
1926, University of Maryland School of Law.
2 Pub. L. No. 696, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., approved June 22, 1938.
'Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 106 (3), Sec. 4. The Act is inapplicable to
municipal, insurance and banking corporations, building and loan associa-
tions and railroad corporations subject to Sec. 77.
3 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 77B, 11 U. S. C. A., Sec. 207 (1934).
The Chandler Act makes no change in the provisions of Sec. 77 entitled
"Reorganization of Railroads Engaged in Interstate Commerce". Chapter
XI of the Chandler Act is a revision of former Sec. 12 relating to Composi-
tions and of former Sec. 74 relating to Extensions and Compositions.
Chapter XI deals with the unsecured debts of corporate debtors as well as
of individuals. A corporate debtor will avail itself of its provisions in
order to effect a rearrangement or extension of unsecured creditors' claims,
including note issues and debenture issues.
r SEC Report on Protective and Reorganization Committees, Pt. I, (May
10, 1937) contained the substance of the major changes recommended. See
Gerdes, Section 77B, The Chandler Bill and Other Proposed Revisions
(1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 361; Dodd, The Securities d Exchange Commis-
sion'8 Reform Program for Bankruptcy Reorganizations (1938) 38 Colum-
bia L. Rev. 223; and Swaine, "Democratization" of Corporate Reorganiza-
tions (1938) 38 Columbia L. Rev. 256.
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House Committees as to the deficiencies of 77B and the
theory of the corporate reorganization provisions of the
Chandler Bill.6 The general purposes of Chapter X, as
declared by Congress,' were:
"To prescribe . ..a carefully prepared plan for
corporate reorganizations, retaining the desirable per-
manent provisions of the new legislation and eliminat-
ing cumbersome, overlapping and inconsistent provi-
sions. "
The Chandler Act became effective on September 22,
1938.8 The provisions of Chapter X are made applicable
in their entirety to reorganization proceedings in which a
petition under 77B was approved on or after June 22,
1938.9 If the petition under 77B was approved prior to June
22, 1938, the provisions of Chapter X are applied to the pro-
ceedings to the extent that the judge deems practicable."
The tax exemption sections," providing that no taxable in-
come or profit shall, in respect to the adjustment or can-
cellation of the indebtedness of a debtor, be deemed to
have been realized by the debtor in the absence of bad
faith, are made retroactive to all plans confirmed under
77B either before or after the effective date of the Act.12
Assuming that A. A. Berle, Jr. was correct in stating
that a legitimate criticism of the Administration is that it
"has indulged in shotgun imposition of regulation without
adequate definition of standard"," the same criticism may
0 Originally introduced in the House as H. R. 6439, 75th Cong.. 1st Sess.
(1937) ; subsequently amended and reintroduced as H. R. 8046, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937). Commissioner William 0. Douglas, Commissioner Jerome
N. Frank and Mr. Martin Riger, Associate Attorney, appeared on behalf of
the SEC at the hearings before the House Committee and the Senate sub-
committee. See Houston, Corporate Reorganizations under the Chandler
Act (1938) 38 Columbia L. Rev. 1199, 1201-1204 for a description of the
development of Chapter X.
" H. R. 1409 containing an explanation of H. R. 8046 known as the
Chandler Bill; concurred in by S. R. 1916.
a Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 7 of the Amendatory Act.
Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 276 c (1). See Bankers Securities Corporation v.
Ritz Carlton Restaurant & Hotel Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. (3d ed.), par.
51367 (C. C. A. 3d 1938) holding Chapter X immediately applicable to a
petition approved on or after June 22, 1938.
10 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 276 c (2). In re Old Algiers, 100 N. Y. L. J. 1131
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1938).
11 Bankruptcy Act. Secs. 268 and 270.
12 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 276 c (3).
Is Memorandum of A. A. Berle, Jr. to the Temporary Economic Committee
(1938).
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not be taken to the definitions of Chapter X. Without ref-
erence to the character of the amendments, the form, defini-
tions and exact phraseology of Chapter X are definite im-
provements over 77B. Conflicts of 77B have been eliminated
and obscurities, and ambiguities clarified. Related but scat-
tered provisions have been assembled and overlapping pro-
visions integrated. The exact and meticulous definition and
statement of Chapter X mark a high level of legislative
draftsmanship and represent an orderly and inclusive
presentation of the law of corporate reorganizations.
JURISMCTION
Although the general jurisdiction of the court is the
same as under 77B, certain notable changes have been made.
A voluntary petition may be filed by the debtor or an in-
voluntary petition may be filed by three or more creditors
holding liquidated claims aggregating $5,000 or more, 4
although it is not necessary that the value of the security
be deducted from the amount of the claims in determin-
ing the jurisdictional amount. Where the securities out-
standing under the indenture are liquidated as to amount
and not contingent as to liability, an indenture trustee may
file an involuntary petition 15 in conformity with the policy
of attempting to make the indenture trustee an active par-
ticipant in the proceeding.
Under 77B it was, doubtful whether creditors having
claims against the debtor's property, but not against the
debtor, could file an involuntary petition. 6 The Chandler
Act eliminates all ambiguities on this point by explicitly
authorizing an involuntary petition to be filed by holders
of claims against the debtor " I or its property".
Under the Chandler Act neither the corporation, credi-
tors nor indenture trustee may file a petition if another
petition by or against the corporation is pending. 7 Al-
" Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 126.
15 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 126. It is unlikely that a trustee under the pre-
vailing forms of indentures, which confer no power on the trustee to file
a petition, will assume the responsibility of doing so.
16 In re Draco Realty Co., 11 F. Supp. 405 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
17 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 128. 77B (a) precluded the filing of a creditors'
petition if the debtor had filed a petition or answer.
1938]
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though this innovation has been given little attention the
change is an important one. Under 77B it frequently oc-
curred that, after an involuntary petition or petitions had
been filed on behalf of creditors but prior to approval, a
voluntary petition by the debtor would be filed in the same
or in another jurisdiction. The debtor acted in order to
select the forum, minimize the position of the petitioning
creditors and improve the status of the debtor in the re-
organization proceedings. In such cases it was the prac-
tice for the voluntary petition of the debtor to be given
the right of way and to be approved. In this connection,
approval of an involuntary petition frequently could not
be had without the delay incident to a hearing on the con-
troversial issue of "good faith", while ordinarily a debt-
or's petition could be speedily acted upon. Considerable
legal authority developed supporting the priority thus
given the debtor's petition.18 The theory of these deci-
sions has been that priority of the approval of the petition
-which has the same consequence and effect as an order of
adjudication-and not priority in the filing of the petitions
determines the right of one court to retain jurisdiction as
against another in which a petition has also been filed. The
effect of the practice has been that under 77B the debtor
has been able to select the forum and, although involuntary
petitions have been occasionally filed, reorganization pro-
ceedings have rarely been had upon them.
By reason of this change an involuntary petition of
creditors or of an indenture trustee becomes of consider-
able practical significance because, when filed in good faith
in a proper case, it will determine the forum and result
in the debtor losing such tangible and intangible benefits
18 See comprehensive discussion in Hamilton Gas Co. v. Watters, 75 F.
(2d) 176 (C. C. A. 4th 1935), where a creditors' petition was filed in West
Virginia; thereafter, a debtor's petition was filed and approved in New
York. Held, preference should be given to the New York venue. Humphrey
v. Bankers Mtge. Co., 79 F. (2d) 345 (C. C. A. 10th 1935). Discussion of
Judge Chesnut In re Kelly Springfield Tire Company, 10 F. Supp. 414 (D. C.
Md. 1935). In re St. Louis Public Service Co., 8 F. Supp. 83 (E. D. Mo.
1934). In re National Department Stores, 8 F. Supp. 19 (D. C. Del.
1934). In re Midland United Company, 12 F. Supp. 502 (D. C. Del. 1935),
where residents of Michigan filed an Involuntary petition there; the debtor
subsequently filed a petition In Delaware which was first approved, the
Delaware court then enjoining further Michigan proceedings.
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as have been associated with the control formerly attach-
ing to a debtor's petition. Clearly, the debtor should not
forego its- right to determine the reorganization forum in
favor of the choice of an irresponsible creditors' petition,
but Chapter X contemplates that the "good faith" require-
ments of a creditors' petition afford adequate protection
against that danger. Although this jurisdictional change
obviates a confusing multiplicity of petitions, it may have
the undesirable consequence of encouraging a race between
the debtor and its creditors to initiate the proceedings.
A corporation which has been dissolved under state law
may not file a voluntary petition for reorganization under
Chapter X. No material change has been made in the defi-
nition of a corporation subject to the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act and there appears to be no provision in
Chapter X to preclude application of the doctrine of Chi-
cago Title & Trust Co. v. 4136 Wilcox Building Co.1" In
that case, under a statute in Illinois a decree had been en-
tered dissolving the corporation for failure to pay fran-
chise taxes, and to file an annual report. The Supreme
Court decided that the corporation was a creature of state
law which in this case had specifically withdrawn its cor-
porate capacity to prosecute any suit or to initiate any
legal proceeding; hence a voluntary petition could not be
filed, the court pointing out that the purpose of the pend-
ing 77B proceeding was a reorganization and continuance
of the corporation which, if successful, would constitute
an effective attempt to thwart the state law. The decision
had the effect of reversing the contrary rule followed in a
number of lower court cases. 20
The court has exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor and
its property, wherever located. Jurisdiction is obtained
upon the filing of the petition and not upon its approval
as under 77B. Pending action upon the petition the judge
may stay prior bankruptcy, foreclosure or receivership
" 302 U. S. 120, 82 L. ed. 109 (1937). Justices Cardozo, Stone and Black
dissenting.2o Old Fort Improvement Co. v. Lea, 89 F. (2d) 286 (C. C. A. 4th 1937);
In re 211 East Delaware Place Building Co., 76 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 7th
1935); Capital Endowment Co. v. Kroeger, 86 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 6th
1936).
1938]
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proceedings or the commencement or continuation of any
suit against the debtor.21 It will be necessary for the court
to act promptly on a petition because the filing of a peti-
tion under Chapter X may have the practical effect of pre-
cluding the debtor from continuing its business since no
person with knowledge may deal safely with the debtor
thereafter.22
VENUE
Under 77B a petition could be filed in the court (a)
where the debtor had its principal place of business, (b)
where the debtor had its principal assets during the pre-
ceding six months or where the greater portion thereof
was located, or (c) where the debtor was incorporated.
The Chandler Act has eliminated the jurisdiction of the
court of the state of incorporation.238
In the original drafts of the bill prepared in 1929 by
the William J. Donovan Committee to revise the Bank-
ruptcy Act, the reorganization sections omitted the state
of incorporation as an alternative jurisdiction. Not until
the bill containing 77B was in conference, after having been
passed by both the House and Senate, was the state of in-
corporation added. Senator Hastings of Delaware was one
of the conference managers in the Senate and responsibility
for the addition has been attributed largely to his influence.
This change of the Chandler Act was designed to elimi-
nate the inconvenient necessity for creditors to appear in
a remote domiciliary jurisdiction in which the corporation
might have no principal place of business and no substan-
tial assets. The change is also said to have been designed
to curb the practice of a debtor or of creditors shopping
for a "friendly" jurisdiction.2 4
21 See In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 11 F. Supp. 359 (N. D. N. Y.
1935), where a temporary stay was granted prior to approval of the peti-
tion under 77B; In re Hotel Martin Co. of Utica, 83 F. (2d) 231 (C. C. A.
2d 1936) ; In re Hygrade Cake Baking Co., 21 F. Supp. 314 (E. D. N. Y.
1937) ; In re Fox Metropolitan Play Houses, 74 F. (2d) 722, 723 (C. C. A.
2d 1935), where the court stated the debtor's property was not in the
custody of the court until the approval of the petition under 77B.
21 Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations: Change8 Effected by Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act. (1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 16.
23 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 128.
9" Jacob I. Weinstein, The Bankruptcy Law of 1938, 204.
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It has been suggested that, where the assets of a cor-
poration are scattered in several jurisdictions or where the
debtor is only a holding company with assets consisting of
securities, the jurisdiction of the domicile should have been
continued. In both situations, however, there is no diffi-
culty in discovering the principal place of business of the
corporation and there is no logical reason why the courts
of that jurisdiction should not be deemed a proper forum.
Since the principal assets of a holding company are fre-
quently found to be pledged under an indenture, its prin-
cipal assets may thus be located at the trustee's domicile
which consequently may become the reorganization forum.2 5
Since a corporation may file a straight bankruptcy pe-
tition in its domicile upon insolvency, the suggestion has
been made that, in order to secure the benefit of the domi-
ciliary jurisdiction, a debtor might proceed first in bank-
ruptcy and then file a petition under Chapter X for re-
organization in the pending bankruptcy proceeding.
If a corporation be a subsidiary, an original petition
by or against it may be filed not only in the forum in which
it has its principal assets or place of business, but also
in the forum where the petition of the parent corporation
has been approved.2 6 Accordingly, it is- possible for a sub-
sidiary to file an original petition in a jurisdiction in which
it has no assets and no place of business and, nevertheless,
have its reorganization conducted there independently of
the reorganization of the parent company.
The judge may transfer a proceeding to a court of bank-
ruptcy in any other district regardless of the location of
the principal assets or the principal place of business if
the interests of the parties will be best served by such
transfer.2 7  This provision disposes of the former restric-
tion that transfer to another court could be made only to
5 In re Central States Edison Company, Bankruptcy Docket No. 60512
(D. C. S. D. N. Y., Coxe, D. J. 1934) (not reported). The assets of a
Delaware holding company with its principal place of business in Illinois
consisted of securities of subsidiaries operating in Southern and Western
states. The securities were pledged under an indenture of trust with a
New York trustee. New York thus became the reorganization forum.
"6 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 129.
'2 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 118.
1938]
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a jurisdiction where an original petition could have been
filed." Now the sole determining factor is the interests
of the parties. It will be noted that in the event a suffi-
cient reason exists for the proceeding to be conducted in
the jurisdiction of the domicile of the debtor, a transfer to
that forum may be effected. This provision will most fre-
quently be invoked to permit an original proceeding by or
against a subsidiary to be transferred to the jurisdiction
where the parent is being reorganized.
THE PETITION
Chapter X requires additional information to be stated
in the petition. A voluntary petition must set forth, as
heretofore, that the corporation is insolvent or unable to
meet its- debts as they mature, the applicable jurisdictional
facts, the nature of the business, the assets and liabilities
of the company, and the desire that a plan be effected. In
addition, the petition must state the nature of all pending
proceedings affecting the property of the corporation, the
status of any plan of reorganization affecting the property
pending in connection with or without any judicial proceed-
ing and reasons, why adequate relief can not be obtained
under Chapter XI of the Act.29
In addition to the allegations required in a voluntary
petition, a creditors' or indenture trustee's petition must
state8" (1) that the corporation was adjudged a bankrupt
in a pending bankruptcy proceeding;"' or (2) that a re-
ceiver or trustee has been appointed for, or has taken
charge of, the property in a pending equity proceeding ;82
or (3) that an indenture trustee or mortgagee is, by rea-
son of a default, in possession of the property of the cor-
28 77B (a); In re Midland United Company, 8 F. Supp. 92 (D. C. Del.
1934).
29 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 130. The new requirements appear to be based
upon the Rules of the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, I. e., Rule 77B-2.
30 Bankruptcy Act, See. 131.
The mere filing of a bankruptcy petition Is not sufficient.
8 Clauses 1 and 2 clarified subdivision (a) of 77B, which merely referred
to "a prior proceeding In bankruptcy or equity receivership" by making it
clear that a petition in bankruptcy or a petition for the appointment of a
receiver Is not enough. This expressed what was apparently contemplated
but was not made plain before.
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poration; 3 or (4) that a proceeding to foreclose a mort-
gage or to enforce a lien against the property of the cor-
poration is pending;"4 or (5) that the corporation has com-
mitted an act of bankruptcy within four months of the fil-
ing of the petition. "
As heretofore, a petition is required to be filed in "good
faith". A petition may not be deemed to be filed in good
faith if (1) the petitioning creditors acquired their claims
for the purpose of filing the petition;31 or (2) adequate re-
lief would be obtainable by a debtor's petition under Chap-
ter XI; 8 or (3) it is unreasonable to expect that a plan
'" This provision was added by reason of a decision of the Supreme Court
that an equity receivership incident to a foreclosure proceeding is not an
"equity receivership" proceeding within the meaning of subdivision (a) of
77B. In Duparquet Huot and Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U. S. 216, 80
L. ed. 591 (1936), there was a receivership for the collection of rents in a
suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage. A decision of the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit (78 F. (2d) 678) holding a 77B creditors'
petition was properly dismissed, was affirmed. In Tuttle v. Harris, 297
U. S. 225, 80 L. ed. 654 (1936) a decision to the contrary of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit (78 F. (2d) 409) was reversed. The
Supreme Court based its conclusion in these cases upon the ground that "an
equity receivership" had a well recognized meaning whereby the assets of
the corporation were committed to the custody of the court until the time
should arrive when they could be returned to the rehabilitated debtor or, if
that were impossible, divided among its creditors. In that case the end
was reorganization or liquidation. A receivership in connection with a
foreclosure suit on the contrary was limited and special, rents being im-
pounded exclusively for the benefit of a particular mortgagee to be applied
upon the mortgage indebtedness in the event of a deficiency. In that case,
therefore, there was neither a winding up nor an attempt to reorganize. It
was indicated that the appointment of a receiver in connection with the
foreclosure proceedings could not be deemed an act of bankruptcy within
the rule that such an act is deemed to have occurred if, "while insolvent
a receiver or trustee has been appointed or put in charge of the property."
The court expressed a qualified opinion that such a receiver must be, a gen-
eral one to gratify this definition of an act of bankruptcy.
8, This clause Is new. The mere institution of a foreclosure proceeding
suffices.
3This clause is unchanged.
30 In re Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 8 F. Supp. 51 (D. C. E. D. Pa.
1934) where it was found petitioners had acquired their bonds for the pur-
pose of filing the petition. "The petition is not in truth a real creditors'
petition and in this sense is not in good faith". To the same effect: In re
Hudson Coal Co., 22 F. Supp. 768 (M. D. Pa. 1938). See: In re North Kenmore
Building Co., 81 F. (2d) 656 (C. C. A..7th 1936) where a corporation was
organized expressly for the purpose of filing a petition under 77B. Held,
the petition was not filed in good faith. See, however, In re Loeb Apart-
ments, 89 F. (2d) 461 (C. C. A. 7th 1937), where the court indicated that,
although the debtor had incorporated for the purpose of the 77B proceed-
ing, the former lack of corporate existence was not a bar on the ground
of bad faith.
87 The fact that adequate relief might be obtained by means of a composi-
tion under the Bankruptcy Act did not preclude relief under 77B. In re
Stanley Drug Co., 22 F. Supp. 664 (E. D. Pa. 1938) ; In re Wison & Golob,
C. C. H. Bankr. Serv., par. 3830 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1936).
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can be effected ;"s or (4) it appears that in a prior proceed-
ing pending in any court, the interests of creditors and
stockholders. would be best subserved thereby. 9 This new
provision embodies several of the tests of "good faith"
which have been developed by the courts in construing 77B.
However, a broader construction of the phrase "good
faith" is permissible since "good faith" is not limited to
the enumerated tests.
A petition may be approved notwithstanding the pen-
dency of a prior mortgage foreclosure, equity or other pro-
ceeding in which a receiver or trustee has been appointed. 0
The trustee, upon qualification, or the debtor, if continued
in possession, is expressly vested with the right to posses-
sion of property of the debtor held by a trustee under a
trust deed or by a mortgagee under a mortgage.41
As under 77B, the court approves the petition if satis-
fied that it has been filed in good faith or dismisses it if
not so satisfied. 2 An answer controverting the material
" Petitions under 77B held not filed in good faith on the ground that a
plan was not feasible: Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. University Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church, 90 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 9th 1937) ; Manati Sugar
Co. v. Mack, 75 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 7th 1935); In re Electric Public
Service Co., 9 F. Supp. 128 (D. C. Del. 1934) ; In re Williamsport Wire
Rope Co., 10 F. Supp. 481 (M. D. Pa. 1935). It has been held that the
filing of a plan with an involuntary petition is not necessary in order for
the creditors to show that a plan can be effected. In re Surf Building Co.,
11 F. Supp. 295 (D. C. Ill. 1934). See In re Lehrenkrauss, 10 F. Supp. 14
(D. C. N. Y. 1935), where a plan was filed by petitioning creditors prior to
approval of petition. Held, it was not the duty of the court in passing on
the petition to consider whether the plan was feasible.
" The interests of creditors and stockholders were held best subserved
in a prior proceeding. In re Chicago Rys., 17 F. Supp. 187 (N. D. Ill.
1936); In re Williamsport Wire Rope Co., 10 F. Supp. 481 (M. D. Pa.
1935), appeal dismissed 78 F. (2d) 1023 (C. C. A. 3d 1935) ; In re Electric
Public Service Co., 9 F. Supp. 128 (D. C. Del. 1934).Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 256.
41 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 257. In re Matter of Francis E. Willard, Na-
tional Temperance Hospital, 82 F. (2d) 804 (C. C. A. 7th 1936). Held,
that the district court was without power to enter an order in a 77B pro-
ceeding directing an indenture trustee, which had taken possession of the
property of the debtor in a foreclosure proceeding and had been operating
the property for the benefit of bondholders to relinquish possession to the
77B trustee. The decision was based upon the Illinois rule that a mort-
gagee, after a condition broken, is the owner of a legal estate and as such
entitled to possession of the mortgaged premises. See also: Reighard v.
Higgins Enterprises, 90 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 3d 1937) ; Continental Bank
& Trust Co. v. Nineteenth & Walnut Street Corp., 79 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A.
3d 1935). It is not certain whether this section is applicable to personal
property which is ordinarily held by the pledgee as collateral prior to a
default.
,2 Bankruptcy Act, Sees. 141, 142.
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allegations of a petition may be filed by any creditor, in-
denture trustee or stockholder.
43
APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEE
Where the liquidated and non-contingent indebtedness
of a debtor is $250,000 or over, the judge shall, upon the
approval of the petition, appoint one or more disinterested
trustees. If the indebtedness is less than $250,000, the
judge may continue the debtor in possession. Where a trus-
tee is appointed, the judge may for operating purposes ap-
point as an additional trustee a person who is a director,
officer or employee of the debtor."
A person shall not be deemed disinterested if (1) he
is a creditor or stockholder of the debtor; or (2) he was
an underwriter of any of the debtor's securities; or (3)
he was within two years before the filing of the petition,
a director, officer, employee or attorney of the debtor or
any such underwriter; or (4) he has an interest materially
adverse to the interests of any class of creditors or stock-
holders by reason of any other relationship to the debtor
or such underwriter, directly or indirectly.4 5
Serious criticism has been leveled at the mandatory re-
quirement that a trustee be appointed in all cases where the
liquidated indebtedness of a debtor is in the aggregate
amount of $250,000 or more. It is argued that in some in-
stances the appointment of a trustee is wholly unnecessary;
that he serves no useful purpose; that his appointment sad-
dles the estate with substantial and unnecessary expense;
that the break-up and liquidation of :small companies will
result; that the good will and business of these small debt-
ors will be destroyed. Therefore, the argument concludes,
the discretionary power of 77B should have been retained.,"
1177B (a) permitted three or more creditors having provable claims
amounting in the aggregate in excess of their security, if any, to $1,000 or
stockholders holding 5% in number of shares of any class to appear and
controvert the facts alleged in the petition.
"1 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 156.
5 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 158.
6 The provision of 77B enabling the continuance of the debtor in pos-
session was believed to permit the proceedings to be conducted with a
minimum of expense and of interruption to the debtor's business. In re
Utilities Power & Light Corp., 90 F.: (2d) 798 (C. C. A. 7th 1937) ; Gerdes,
1938]
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A survey by the SEC of 77B proceedings conducted
during the year 1936 indicated that in a majority of cases
the debtor was continued in possession. 7 The legal inci-
dents of continuing the debtor in possession are significant.
Upon the approval of a petition, although the debtor re-
remains, in possession, the property of the debtor is placed
in oustodia leges4 5 A debtor in possession holds the es-
tate as agent of the court. His position has been said to
be analogous to that of a receiver in equity, 9 and he is
given the powers of a trustee in bankruptcy during pen-
dency of reorganization proceedings. 50
This practice of continuing the debtor in possession
in effect represented a restoration of the "friendly" re-
ceivership which prevailed as the principal means of achiev-
ing a reorganization prior to 77B. The consequences of
leaving the debtor in possession may be deemed to approxi-
mate those ensuing from the appointment of an officer or
agent of the debtor as trustee or receiver. It will be re-
called that in Harkin v. Brundage,.1 the Supreme Court of
the United States, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, con-
Corporate Reorganizations: Changes Effected by Chapter X of the Bank-
ruptcy Act (November, 1938) Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9; Sen. Rep. No. 482, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 4. See: Argument against the mandatory trustee
made by Hon. John C. Knox, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of New York, Hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on
H. R. 8046.
"7 SEC Report, Pt. II, p. 523, N. 4, states that in 77% of 950 cases under
Sections 77 and 77B in 1936 the debtor was continued in possession. Judge
William C. Coleman (U. S. D. C. Md.) adopted the general practice of ap-
pointing trustees in practically all cases. For criticism of the practice of
continuing debtors in possession see: E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Reorganization
Through Bankruptcy, (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1100-1114; James Carey, 3d,
Reorganizations Under Section 77B of the National Bankruptcy Act, The
Daily Record, Baltimore, Feb. 6, 1936; In re Consolidation Coal Company,
Bankruptcy Docket No. 7850 (D. C. Md. 1934) (not reported). In declin-
ing to continue the debtor In possession Judge Coleman expressed dissatis-
faction at the commencement of the proceedings at the idea of having the
court act through the officers and agents of the corporation as distinguished
from an independent individual directly accountable to the court. Judge
Neilds in the District of Delaware adopted the practice under 77B of not
continuing the debtor in possession unless at the time of the filing of the
petition the debtor presented a plan which was apparently fair and feasible,
or the court was assured that a plan would be filed promptly.
,8 In re Fox Metropolitan Play Houses, Inc., 74 F. (2d) 722, 723 (C. C.
A. 2d 1935).
" In re Avorn Dress Co., Inc., 78 F. (2d) 681, 683 (C. C. A. 2d 1935).
"In re Cleveland and Sandusky Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 198, 206 (D.
C. Ohio 1935).
Is 276 U. S. 36, 55, 72 L. ed. 457 (1928).
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demned the widespread practice of appointing "friendly"
receivers. The Court said:
"As the Court of Appeals says, there should be no
'friendly' receivership because the receiver is an of-
ficer of the court and should be as free from 'friendli-
ness' to a party as should the court itself."
In National Surety Co. v. CorieUl, 5 in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Brandeis, the Supreme Court said:
"Every important determination by the court in
receivership proceedings calls for an informed inde-
pendent judgment."
While the Supreme Court had taken steps to require
the appointment of independent receivers in equity reor-
ganizations, 77B has been employed to perpetuate in es-
sence the outlawed practice of the continuance of a parti-
san debtor in possession. It must be recognized that re-
organization proceedings are only incidentally law suits,
that primarily they represent a problem in corporate
finance. The conduct of the proceedings is of necessity
largely administrative. To determine whether a plan is
fair and feasible, there is required an informed indepen-
dent judgment based upon inquiry, investigation, examina-
tion and analysis of the cause of the bankruptcy, the worth
of the assets, the character of the management, past earn-
ings, probable future earnings and what should constitute
a sound financial structure. Under 77B there was rarely
an independent opinion or a disinterested source of in-
formation available to the judge. When he acted upon a
plan he did so largely upon the basis of an impression
formed from the testimony of officers of the debtor and from
statements made, during the course of one or more hear-
ings, by counsel whose clients were deemed to have a first
call upon their loyalty.
Where the debtor was continued in possession, the judge
did not have -the benefit of the advice of even a "friendly"
receiver for the anomaly occurred of a receivership with-
out a receiver and of a theoretically prostrate corporation
elevated to a position of unwarranted power and responsi-
"289 U. S. 426, 436, T7 L. ecL 130 (1932).
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bility. The suppliant debtor, seeking the respite offered
by a bankruptcy court and permitted to suspend all legal
and equitable remedies of secured and unsecured creditors,
was nevertheless vested with the powers of an equity re-
ceiver and of a trustee in bankruptcy. The difficult position
of the court under 77B was. well described by a commis-
sioner of the Securities & Exchange Commission when he
said:
"Now consider the task which confronts the judge
when he undertakes, under Section 77B, to determine
the fairness and equity, and feasibility, of a proposed
plan of reorganization. For guidance on the host of
questions,-financial, business, economic and legal-
which present themselves, he must depend upon a bi-
ased debtor, a trustee who all too frequently is, parti-
!san, if a trustee has been appointed at all, and upon
the committees for bondholders and stockholders. Oc-
casionally the isolated creditor or stockholder may be
represented, in good faith or for the sake of a nuisance
value, if one can be created. One of two things will
generally happen. The judge must set out on a search
for the truth as it may be present in a welter of parti-
san charges, often bald misinformation, and exag-
gerated claims. His search and determination are
reduced to the level of a guess as to the credibility of
highly distorted and conflicting allegations. Or, as
may happen more frequently, he finds a "united front"
before him, with all seeming differences composed. If
anything, this is even less effective as a test of the
truth. Rarely will the judge be apprised adequately
of the considerations which have made for compro-
mise, or their effect upon the interests of investors. 158
It has been pointed out that the Supreme Court of the
United States was the inspiration for these provisions of
Chapter X separating the trustee from the debtor, stock-
holders and underwriters. Their underlying purpose is
to insure that the judge has before him detailed and authen-
tic information in considering a reorganization plan. In
National Surety Co. v. Coriell, the Supreme Court re-
5 Address of Jerome N. Frank before the American Bar Association,
Cleveland, Ohio, July 25, 1938.
61 Supra, note 52.
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versed a decree approving the plan on the ground that
the judge did not have before him sufficiently definite and
accurate information to form a reliable opinion as to the
fairness of the plan and moreover did not have the benefit
of advice from its receiver. The Court remarked:
"The District Court had before it, in support of
the plan, only information inadequate and confficting
ex parte assertions unsupported by testimony. It un-
dertook to pass upon the wisdom and fairness of the
plan of reorganization, and the rights of non-assent-
ing creditors. For the proper disposition of these
questions definite, detailed and authentic information
was essential. Such information was wholly lacking."
"The receiver submitted no facts and made no rec-
ommendations. I I
"The proceeding was not an adversary one and
jurisdiction rested wholly upon the consent of the de-
fendant corporation. The court did not have the ad-
vice of its receiver."
In First National Bank v. Flershem,5 the Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis, again em-
phasized the necessity for an informed independent judg-
ment by reason of the special nature of reorganization pro-
ceedings. There the lower court had approved a plan in
a consent receivership of the National Radiator Corpora-
tion, whose officers felt that a reorganization was necessary
although the Supreme Court found that insolvency was
neither present nor imminent and an interest default was
purely voluntary. The Court said:
"The District Court did not make an appraisal
by independent experts. In fixing the upset price and
in confirming the sale, it relied practically upon the
evidence given and introduced by officers of the corpo-
ration and the members of the reorganization com-
mittee."
"In justifying the action taken, the Court of Ap-
peals called attention to the fact that the non-assent-
ing creditors had not introduced any evidence to prove
S20 U. S. 504, 525, 78 L. ed. 465 (1934).
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their contention that the sale should not be confirmed.
In view of the undisputed facts stated above, the in-
troduction of such evidence was not indispensable. The
failure to secure an adequate price seems to have been
due, not to lack of opposing evidence, but to the mis-
taken belief that it was the duty of the court to aid
in effectuating the plan of reorganization since a very
large majority of the debenture holders had assented
to it. Moreover, the court stood in a position different
from that which it occupies in ordinary litigation where
issues are to be determined solely upon such evidence
as the contending parties choose to introduce. In re-
ceivership proceedings as was held in National Surety
Company v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426, 436; 77 Law Ed.
1800, every determination by the court calls for an in-
formed independent judgment; and special reasons
exist for requiring adequate trustworthy information
where the jurisdiction rests wholly upon the consent
of the defendant who joins in the prayers for relief."
It is submitted that the criticism directed at the manda-
tory requirement of the appointment of a trustee where
the liquidated indebtedness of a debtor aggregates $250,-
000 is not persuasive. Under Chapter X the court and se-
curity holders will have the benefit of an impartial source
upon which they may rely for information and for that
"informed independent judgment" which the Supreme
Court of the United States has declared to be essential in
reorganization proceedings. The discharge of the duties
relative to formulation of a plan and investigation of the
management of the debtor would seem to make the require-
ment of an independent and disinterested trustee inevi-
table."8 Insofar as the charge of excessive expense is con-
cerned, the control exercised by the court over allowances
should prove adequate protection against the imposition
of an undue financial burden upon the estate.
'" In advocating the mandatory appointment of a trustee, the primary
objective of the SEC was to take the conduct of the debtor's business out
of the hands of the management which had proven unsuccessful and to
facilitate the discovery and pursuit of corporate assets which might exist
in the form of claims against directors, officers and persons affiliated with
them. SEC Report on Protective and Reorganization Committees (May
10, 1937 Pt. I, pp. 157-160, Pt. II, pp. 11-164, 186-200. The Commission
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the security holder's conventional legal
weapon, the minority stockholder's suit. SEC Report, Pt. I, pp. 694, 870.
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The requirement that the trustee be disinterested will
not materially affect the practice formerly prevailing in
certain districts in cases where trustees were appointed.57
Under Article X where it is deemed desirable, a director,
officer or employee of the debtor may be appointed as an
additional trustee for operating purposes, but he may not
exercise any of the other duties of the disinterested trus-
tee.5 8 It is further provided that an attorney appointed for
a trustee shall be disinterested. However, an attorney not
disinterested within the meaning of the Act may, with the
approval of the judge, be employed for the performance of
specific services; but he may not represent the trustee in
conducting the proceedings.5 9
The disqualification of counsel for the debtor to act as
counsel for the trustee is a logical one in view of the new
duties imposed upon the trustee. Whether the same dis-
qualification extends to counsel for creditors is not entirely
clear. The definition of the word "disinterested" does not
explicitly refer to a creditor relationship. If such a dis-
qualification be held to exist, it will be based upon the
catch-all provision that a person is not disinterested if "it
appears that he has, by reason of any other direct or in-
direct relationship to, connection with, or interest in the
debtor or such underwriter, or for any reason an interest
materially adverse to the interests of any class of credi-
tors or stockholders."6
The Chandler Act provides that, "if the judge shall so
direct", the trustee shall investigate the affairs, conduct,
property, liabilities and financial condition of the debtor,
the operation of its business and the advisability of its
continuance; shall report thereon to the judge; may ex-
amine the directors and officers and any other witnesses
concerning the foregoing matters; shall report to the judge
any fraud, misconduct, mismanagement or any irregu-
51 It has been customary in the districts of Maryland and Delaware for
the court to appoint as trustee either a person who has no relationship to
the parties or an officer of the debtor and a disinterested person.
58 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 156. See: In re Hotel Martin Co. of Utica,
83 F. (2d) 233 (C. C. A. 2d 1936).
Bankruptcy Act, See. 157.
Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 156 (4).
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larity and the facts with respect to any cause of action
available to the estate; may with the approval of the judge
employ such persons as may be needed to assist him in his
duties; and shall submit a brief statement of his investi-
gations to creditors, stockholders, indenture trustees, Se-
curities & Exchange Commission and such other persons
as the judge may designate.6 '
Prior to a late amendment in 1938, the Chandler Bill
62
provided that the trustee should "forthwith under the con-
trol of the judge" make the investigation and report de-
scribed above. In its then mandatory form, this provision
was criticized on the ground that in many cases such an in-
vestigation is unnecessary, arbitrarily increases reorgani-
zation expenses and delays the reorganization. In its
present form it is difficult to believe that this provision is
subject to valid criticism. Resort to a court of bankruptcy
has always been deemed a matter of gravity and of public
interest. Why should less inquiry be had into the causes
underlying the plight of a debtor, which seeks affirmative
relief from creditors in order to preserve an alleged equi-
ty, than in the case of a bankrupt which proposes liquida-
tion of its assets and their distribution in full to creditors?
But even if the provisions of Chapter X were designed
merely to afford a facile process for the readjustiment or
extension of corporate securities, the court and creditors
are surely entitled to make inquiry as to the character of
the management and as to the reason the corporation re-
quires the drastic remedy of a court of bankruptcy. It
would be difficult for the court and security holders to ap-
praise the worth of the management in connection with any
plan and determine intelligently whether it should be con-
tinued without reliable information as to the history of the
company.
The trustee need no longer reside or have an office in
the district in which he is appointed. Corporations, may
serve as trustees if authorized so to do by their charters or
11 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 167. Where the Judge does not direct an invest i -
gation, the duty of the trustee to submit to security holders a statement of
the financial condition of the debtor is not clear.
62 H. R. 8046.
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by-laws.63 The trustee is appointed upon the approval of
the petition and no provision is made for "temporary"
and "'permanent" trustees.
THE PLAN
Where a trustee has been appointed the judge shall fix
a time within which the trustee shall prepare and file a
plan, or report his reasons why a plan cannot be effected,
and shall hold a subsequent hearing for the consideration
of any objections, amendments or plans which may be pro-
posed by the debtor or by any creditor or stockholder."
The trustee shall give notice to creditors and stockholders
that they may submit to him plans or suggestions for the
formulation of a plan within a designated time."3
The disinterested trustee is thus charged with the re-
sponsibility of negotiating and formulating a plan. He
becomes the clearing house for proposals of plans whether
by the debtor, creditors or stockholders. It is intended
that he will participate in and supervise negotiations
among the various interests, and, although at the subse-
quent hearing before the court other plans or proposals
may be submitted, the primary responsibility for submit-
ting a plan to the court rests, with him.6 Neither the
debtor nor creditors may assume the initiative of propos-
ing a plan until the hearing before the court on the plan
formulated by the trustee. The debtor is thus restrained
from exercising the dominant role frequently assumed un-
der 77B.
It is believed that the theory of a disinterested person
vested with the responsibility for formulation of a plan
should contribute to the evolution of a proper plan. A
more desirable solution might have been to require the ap-
pointment of a special master to act in the quasi-judicial
capacity of settling basin for incipient plans, and to im-
61 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 156. Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations: Changes
Effected by Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act (Nov., 1938) Harv. L. Rev.
1, 11.
6, Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 168.
05 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 167.08 Jacob I. Weinstein, The Bankruptcy Law of 1938, 216.
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pose different types of functions upon different officials.6 7
It is evident that few persons are sufficiently versatile to
qualify as trustee in a reorganization when the position
requires a hybrid specialist who is at the same time an effec-
tive executive, relentless investigator and financial expert.
The answer must be that in practice a substantial amount
of the work of the trustee will be done by counsel to the
trustee and under Chapter X, as in past corporate reor-
ganizations, whether through mortgage foreclosure, judi-
cial sale, equity receivership or 77B, lawyers will continue
to. play an essential part.
The provisions regarding the requirements: of a plan
are more exacting than the comparable provisions of 77B.
The plan must include equitable provisions compatible with
creditor and stockholder interests and consistent with
public policy with respect to the manner of selecting per-
sons who are to be directors, officers: or voting trustees, if
any, and their respective successors, upon the conslumma-
tion of the plan.68  The plan must require in the charter
of the debtor or of any corporation organized for the pur-
pose of carrying out the plan (a) provisions prohibiting
the issuance of non-voting stock and maintaining among
the several classes of securities a fair and equitable distri-
bution of voting power, including adequate provisions for
the election of directors representing preferred stock in
the event of default in the payment of dividends, and (b)
"I Where the debtor is continued in possession this separation of function
is recognized. Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 168. See: Utilities Power & Light
Corp., 90 F. (2d) 798 (C. C. A. 7th 1937) where the debtor under 77B
was continued in possession but the court appointed an investigator to
examine into charges of improper conduct on the part of the management.
See also: Gerdes, Corporate Reorgani.ations (1937) 71 U. S. L. Rev. 443,
452-53. Under 77B a special master has been frequently appointed in the
District of Maryland to advise the judge as to the fairness and feasibility
of a plan. In re American States Public Service Co., Bankruptcy Docket
No. 7851 (U. S. D. C. Md. 1934) not reported on this point; In re North
Avenue Market, Inc., Bankruptcy Docket No. 8687 (U. S. D. C. Md. 1936)
not reported; In re Anchor Post Fence Co., 14 F. Supp. 801 (U. S. D. C.
Md. 1936) ; In re Hugo Stinnes, Bankruptcy Docket No. 8575 (U. S. D. C.
Md. 1936) not reported; In re Hugo Stinnes Industries, Inc., Bankruptcy
Docket No. 8576 (U. S. D. C. Md. 1936) not reported. See: In re United
States Dairy Products Corporation, Bankruptcy Docket No. 7855 (U. S.
D. C. Md. 1934) not reported, where the trustees and their counsel were
largely responsible for the development of the reorganization plan although
the plan was filed in the name of the debtor.68 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 216 (11).
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fair and equitable provisions with respect to the terms,
rights and privileges of the several classes of securities, in-
cluding provisions relating to the issuance, acquisition,
purchase, retirement or redemption of any such securities
and the declaration or payment of any dividends thereon.69
REPORT OF SEC
After the hearing and before the approval of any plan,
the judge may, in cases in which the scheduled indebted-
ness does not exceed $3,000,000, and shall, in cases in which
the scheduled indebtedness exceeds $3,000,000, refer to the
SEC for examination and report the plan or plans deemed
by him worthy of consideration. Such report shall be ad-
visory only.70 No plan may be approved until the SEC
has had a reasonable opportunity to file its report.71 Upon
the approval of the plan, the trustee or debtor in possession
shall transmit to all creditors and stockholders who are af-
fected by the plan (1) the plan so approved, together with
a summary approved by the judge, (2) the opinion of the
judge approving the plan, or a summary approved by the
judge, (3) the report of the SEC or a summary prepared
by the SEC, and (4) "such other matters as the judge may
deem necessary or desirable for the information of credi-
tors and stockholders' 2 The SEC shall, if requested by
the judge, and may, upon its own motion if approved by the
judge, file an appearance in a proceeding under Chapter X,
and shall thereupon be deemed a party in interest with the
right to be heard on all matters arising in the proceed-
ing, but the Commission does not have a right of appeal.'
This provision, designed to give the court and security
holders the benefit of the advice and recommendations of
an experienced commission of experts, represents the most
drastic reform of the Chandler Act, by the injection of the
administrative tribunal into the proceedings of the judici-
ary. Without attempting to consider the desirability
60 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 216 (12).
70 Bankruptcy Act, See. 172.
71 Bankruptcy Act, See. 173.
72 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 175.
73 Bankruptcy Act, See. 208. The Commission Is not expressly precluded,
however, from being heard on an appeal taken by another party.
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of the governmental tendency represented by this inno-
vation, it is apparent that in the final analysis its suc-
cess will depend upon how expeditiously, fairly and im-
partially the SEC meets the responsibility imposed
upon it by Chapter X."4 From a theoretical standpoint,
it is desirable that the federal courts and security
holders be granted the benefit of expert disinterested ad-
vice with reference to the difficult problems involved in a
readjustment of conflicting equities.75 However, there ap-
pears to be some fear that under the guise of an advisory
opinion the SEC may attempt to exercise substantial con-
trol over the adoption of a plan of reorganization. If the
SEC yields its necessary technique of impartial approach
to the temptation of aggressively championing the rights of
particular classes of security holders, it will not be dif-
ficult to predict that operation under these provisions of
Chapter X will prove unsatisfactory. If the SEC becomes
an advocate instead of a technical advisor, content to offer
its advice for what it may be worth, the reorganization
proceedings cannot avoid the serious threat of disorgani-
zation.
There are undoubted disadvantages under the revised
procedure of Chapter X. Delays seem inevitable. The
report of the SEC may be of such significance and may so
influence the reorganization proceedings that the parties
will wish to appear and be heard before the SEC. The
proponent of a plan referred to the SEC may feel bound to
present his case to avoid an adverse report. Informal dis-
cussions between the trustee and representatives of security
holders will be followed by a hearing before the judge; and
the hearing before the judge, who has the power to approve
a plan, may be followed by an informal hearing before the
74 Commissioner Samuel 0. Clark, Jr., has become director of the recently
organized Reorganization Division of the SEC. Regional offices have been
located in New York, Boston, Chicago, Atlanta, Ft. Worth, Denver, Seattle
and San Francisco to facilitate the performance of the additional work of
the Commission.
7 See: Statement of Hon. John C. Knox, Senior United States District
Judge for the Southern District of New York, as to the advantages of the
appearance of the SEC in the reorganization proceedings. [Hearings on
H. R. 6439 (reintroduced and reported as H. R. 8046) before House Com-
mittee on Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 365-366.]
[VOL. III
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
SEC which is without power to approve a plan. The re-
sult is divided responsibility and a succession of delays.
In this connection, Chapter X failed to fix a definite period
within which the SEC could be required to act when its ad-
vice was requested.7 6
77B was designed to afford an expeditious corporate
reorganization procedure which would permit reorganizers
to deal effectively with dissenters. The provisions of Chap-
ter X are calculated to produce the fairest possible reor-
ganizatibn plan by the creation of a more elaborate system
of checks and balances. Under the new complicated and un-
tried procedure the emphasis is upon the beneficial result
to be attained rather than upon the speedy accomplishment
of the reorganization.
APPROVAL OF PLAN
Under the revised procedure of the Chandler Act the
judge approves the plan as fair, equitable and feasible be-
fore it may be submitted to creditors and stockholders."
Without the consent of the court no person may solicit any
acceptance of a plan or any authority to accept a plan
whether by proxy, deposit or power of attorney until after
the judge has entered an order approving it, and the plan
has been transmitted for acceptance. Any acceptance or
authority procured by solicitation before such approval
and transmittal without the consent of the court is deemed
invalid.
The development of the law of corporate reorganiza-
tions indicates a continuing, trend towards the extension
of the judicial power to enable the court to act upon a plan
before it has reached an advanced stage. It will be recalled
that at the time Northern Pacific RR Co. v. Boyd79 was
decided no legal machinery had been developed for the de-
termination of the validity of a reorganization plan prior
to its completion. This decision resulted in an earnest ef-
76 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 173 does provide that the judge may fix a reason-
able time for the filing of the report of the SEC.
77 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 174.
78 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 176. The Act does not forbid the solicitation of
dissents to a plan prior to approval by the judge.
19 228 U. S. 482 (1912).
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fort by lawyers and others interested in corporate reor-
ganizations to devise a means whereby a specific plan of
reorganization could be approved by a court of appropri-
ate jurisdiction in advance of its consummation. Subse-
quent decisions prior to 77B established that the fairness
of a plan might be determined upon application for con-
firmation of a sale pursuant to the plan, but it was recog-
nized that there was no general right in security holders to
compel such a determination in anticipation of the fore-
closure decree."0 Until the adoption of 77B in 1934 the
court had no jurisdiction to pass on the fairness of a re-
organization plan except as an incident to the confirmation
of a judicial sale and in legal theory the entire proceeding
was directed to liquidation. 77B provided for the confirma-
tion of a plan after it had been duly accepted in writing
by creditors holding the requisite amount of claims,8' but
there was no express provision for the approval of the
plan by the judge prior to acceptance on behalf of credi-
tors and, when required, of stockholders.
"0 Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Develop-
ments of Last Decade (1927) 27 Columbia Law Journal, 901, 910. In Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. Chicago M. & St. Paul RR. Co., 15 F. (2d) 434 (D. C.
N. D. Ill. 1926), where a decree for sale of railroad property in a mort-
gage foreclosure proceeding provided for a hearing of stockholders and
bondholders on the adequacy and fairness of a reorganization plan before
confirmation of sale, it was held that the junior bondholders were not en-
titled in advance of the sale to an anticipatory ruling as to the adequacy
of any bid or the fairness of a reorganization plan.
The general practice was for the determination of the fairness of the
plan to be made upon the confirmation of the sale. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. v. MacElvain, 253 Fed. 123, 126 (E. D. Mo. 1918). Westinghouse Elec.
& Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co., (U. S. D. C. S. D. N. Y., Cons.
Cause Eq. No. E15-347, 1923) not reported; American Brake Shoe & Foun-
dry Co. v. N. Y. Rys. (U. S. D. C. S. D. N. Y., Cons. Cause Eq. No. E-17-89,
1924) not reported. Occasionally a determination of the fairness of the
plan was secured in advance of the foreclosure decree or the sale, although
there was a serious question whether the decision was moot and not bind-
ing. Habirshaw Elec. Cable Co. v. Habirshaw Elec. Cable Co., 296 Fed.
875, 879 (C. C. A. 2d 1924). Eastern States Public Service Co. v. Atlantic
Public Utilities, 156 At]. 214 (Del. 1931). The machinery for determining
the fairness of the plan was usually set up in the foreclosure decree which
would provide that the court would hear complaints as to the fairness of
offers to various classes of security holders and the court reserved the
power to modify the foreclosure decree if such offers had not been made.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry., supra; Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Mo. Pac. R. (U. S. D. C. Mo., E. Div., Cons. Cause, Eq. No. 4540,
1916) not reported. The judicial determination of the fairness of the plan
in connection with the confirmation of the sale was binding on all creditors.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Wall (U. S. D. C. E. D. Mo., Cons. Cause.
Eq. No. 4857, 1918) not reported.61 See. 77B (E) (1).
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Approval of the plan prior to its acceptance constitutes
an important step in the revised procedure for the formu-
lation, consideration and acceptance of a plan. This pro-
cedure is similar to that provided for under Section 77
except that under Section 77 the plan is approved by the
Interstate Commerce Commission instead of the judge.
The change is said to have been patterned after an in-
formal practice which has grown up under 77B in certain
districts. 2 Creditors and stockholders are protected from
solicitation before there is full information, investigation
and scrutiny of the plan. High pressure tactics of invest-
ment bankers, protective committees and the like on behalf
of any plan that may be proposed, regardless of its merit,
are ended. The judge is enabled to consider plans objec-
tively without being harassed by pressure groups purport-
ing to represent predominant holdings of securities and
without being consciously or unconsciously influenced in
determining the fairness of the plan by the purported back-
ing security holders may have given it. 3 He is no longer
presented with a fait accompli and faced with the unenvi-
8" Under 77B a plan was sometimes approved informally by the judge
before it had been submitted to, or accepted by the required majorities of
security holders. In the District of Maryland, the District of Delaware,
and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania it has not been the practice
for the judge to approve a plan either tentatively or informally under these
conditions although frequently the important features of the plan have
been discussed fully with the judge in advance of the hearing on the con-
firmation of the plan. In re Hopkins Lake Drive Apartments Corp., Bank-
ruptcy Docket No. 7960 (U. S. D. C. Md. 1935), not reported, Judge Chesnut
at a preliminary hearing disclaimed any authority to approve a plan, but
he specified a formula which had the effect of limiting and defining any
plan proposed but at the same time was extremely helpful to the parties.
At that time two plans had been submitted to creditors, one proposed by
the debtor and the other by a large number of bondholders. In Downtown
Investment Co. v. Boston Metropolitan Building, Inc., 81 F. (2d) 314, 321
(C. C. A. 1st 1936), the court disapproved of the judge passing upon the
fairness of the plan before it had been assented to by creditors on the
ground that it might be deemed an attempt by the judge to influence
security holders in favor of a plan. See: Alley and Ellsworth, Tentative
Approval-Its Use, Abuse and Remedy (1937) 4 Corp. Reorg. 11.
11 In Downtown Investment Co. v. Boston Metropolitan Building, Inc.,
supra, note 82, the court stated that in determining the fairness of the plan
the judge should be greatly influenced by the fact that it had been accepted
by a high percentage of the parties affected. In practice great weight has
been given by the judge to the support given a plan in determining whether
it is fair and equitable. See: In re A. C. Hotel Co., 93 Fed. (2d) 841 (C.
C. A. 7th 1937) ; In re Day and Meyer, Murray & Young, 93 F. (2d) 657,
659 (C. C. A. 2d 1938) ; In re Barclay Park Corp., 90 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A.
2d 1937; In re Wilbur-Suchard Chocolate Co., 33 Am. B. R. (N. S.)
291 (E. D. Pa. 1937).
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able choice of either confirming the plan and permitting
the prompt completion of the proceedings or frustrating
the apparent wishes of informed or uninformed security
holders with the delays attendant upon any other action.84
On the other hand, it is clearly desirable that the parties
in interest know at the outset whether a plan will be able
to secure court approval before the time, energy and money
involved in its submission to security holders are expended.
CREDITORS AND STOCKHOLDERS
Throughout Chapter X there is wide recognition of the
right of the debtor, any creditor, indenture trustee or any
stockholder to be heard on all matters. s5 Thus, material
allegations of a petition may be controverted by any credi-
tor, indenture trustee or stockholder." A plan may be pro-
posed by the debtor, any creditor, any stockholder or an
indenture trustee.8 7 The debtor, the indenture trustees and
any creditor and stockholder have the right to be heard
on all matters.8 8
After the approval of the petition, the judge prescribes
the manner in which, and fixes the time within which, the
8, See: In re American Department Stores Corporation, Bankruptcy
Docket No. 1058 (D. C. Del. 1936) not reported, where a special master
reported adversely on a plan, but between the time of his report and the
hearing thereon the debentures of the persons opposing the plan were
"bought out". Judge Neilds overruled the report of the special master
and approved the plan referring to the fact that there was no opposition.
Previously Judge Neilds had refused to confirm an earlier plan (16 F.
Supp. 977). It is of interest that, in In re Allegany Corporation, 75 Fed.
(2d) 947 (C. 0. A. 4th 1935) the judge was presented with a plan which
had already been accepted by the required majorities of security holders
before the 77B petition was filed and, indeed, before 77B had been enacted.
88 Bankruptcy Act, Secs. 206, 207, 209. Under 77B (c) a creditor or
stockholder had the right to be heard on the permanent appointment of
trustees, on the confirmation of a plan and, upon filing a petition for leave
to intervene, on such other questions as the judge should permit.
8" Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 144. 77B (a) required three or more creditors
having provable claims amounting in the aggregate in excess of their se-
curity, if any, to $1,000, or stockholders holding 5% in number of shares of
any class to be permitted to appear and controvert the facts alleged in the
petition..
"I Bankruptcy Act, Secs. 169, 170. Under 77B (d) a plan could be pro-
posed by any creditor or by any stockholder provided that the plan had
been approved by creditors affected whose claims were not less than 25%
in amount of the class and not less than 10% in amount of all claims
against the debtor, or if the debtor was insolvent by stockholders affected
by the plan provided their stock was not less than 10% of the class of stock
outstanding and not less than 5% of the total number of shares of all stock
outstanding.8 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 206.
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proofs of claim of creditors and of the interests: of stock-
holders may be filed and allowed. Objections to the allow-
ance of any such claims or interests are summarily deter-
mined by the court.8 9 For the purposes of the plan and its
acceptance the judge fixes the division of the creditors and
stockholders into classes according to the nature of their
respective claims and stock. For the purposes of such
classification the judge shall, if necessary, upon application
fix a hearing upon notice to determine summarily the value
of the security and classify as unsecured the amount in
excess of such value.90 The voting on a plan by creditors
and stockholders is essentially the same as under 77B.
An indenture trustee may file claims for all holders
of securities issued pursuant to the indenture who have not
filed claims,91 provided, however, that in computing the ma-
jority necessary for the acceptance of the plan only claims
filed by the holders and allowed may be included.2
In case an executory contract is rejected pursuant to
the provisions of the plan or under the authority of the
court any person injured thereby shall for the purposes
of the plan and its acceptance be deemed a creditor. The
three year limitation of rent upon the claim of a land-
lord for injury resulting from the rejection of an unex-
pired lease found in 77B (b) is preserved.93
An attorney for creditors or stockholders shall not be
heard unless he has first filed with the court a statement
setting forth the names and addresses of such creditors or
stockholders, the nature and amounts of their claims or
stock and the time of their acquisition, except as to claims
or stock alleged to have been acquired more than one year
prior to the filing of a petition.94 The judge is granted con-
Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 196.
Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 197. This provision simplifies Section 77B (c)(6).
91 This is in accordance with the holding In re Allied Owners Corp.,
74 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 2d 1934).
92 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 198.
11 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 202. Provisions of 77B with reference to the
limitation of rent held constitutional in Kuhner v. Irving Trust Co., 299
U. S. 456, 81 L. ed. 348 (1937), affirming 85 F. (2d) 35 (C. C. A. 2d 1936)
and City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 433, 81
L. ed. 324 (1937).
91 Bankruptcy Act, See. 210.
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trol over protective committees and other representatives
of creditors and stockholders. To enable the judge to ex-
ercise his control effectively, relevant information is re-
quired to be furnished to the Court concerning the employ-
ment and interests of such representatives and the inter-
ests of the persons represented. 5 As under 77B, the judge
may disregard the provisions of any authorization, force
an accounting, restrain the exercise of any power found to
be unfair or inconsistent with public policy and may limit
any claims or stock acquired by attorneys, agents, inden-
ture trustees or committees in contemplation of or in the
course of the proceeding to the consideration paid there-
for."'
CONFIRMATION OF PLAN
The conditions under which the judge shall confirm a
plan are derived generally from 77B.17 Acceptances must
be filed by the holders of two-thirds in amount of the claims
filed and allowed of each class of securities affected. Claims
filed by an indenture trustee, but not by the holders of the
claims, will not be considered in computing the necessary
acceptances. The judge must be satisfied that the plan
is fair, equitable and feasible; that the proposal of the
plan and its acceptance are in good faith and have not been
procured by means forbidden by the act; that all payments
made or promised for services and expenses in connection
with the proceeding have been fully disclosed and are rea-
sonable ;98 that the plan provides for any class of creditors,
affected by the plan but not accepting the plan by two-
thirds majority in amount, adequate protection for the real-
ization of the value of their claims against the property
dealt with by the plan, and that the plan provides for any
class of stockholders, affected by the plan but not accept-
ing the plan by a majority of the stock, adequate protec-
tion for the realization of the value of their equity, if
any, in the property of the debtor, provided that such pro-
" Bankruptcy Act, Secs. 210, 211 and 212.
01 Bankruptcy Act, See. 212.
9 7 Section 77B (f), (g) and (h).
98 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 221.
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tection is not required if the judge determines that the
debtor is insolvent.99
A new provision, consists in the requirement that the
judge shall be satisfied of the full disclosure of the iden-
tity, qualifications and affiliations of the persons who are
to be directors, officers or voting trustees upon the con-
summation of the plan and that their appointment to, or
continuance in, such offices is "equitable, compatible with
the interests of the creditors and stockholders and consis-
tent with public policy".100 This provision was designed to
require an accounting as to the competency and integrity
of the management and the elimination of any objection-
able elements from the management which is recognized as
ordinarily self-perpetuating. If the acceptance or failure
to accept a plan by the holder of a claim or stock is not
in good faith, after hearing the judge may direct that such
claim or stock be disqualified for the purpose of ascertain-
ing the required majority for the acceptance of the plan.101
LISTS OF SECURITY HOLDERS
The Chandler Act provides that any person, other than
the debtor or trustee, having possession or control of a
list of security holders of the debtor or information as to
their names, addresses or the securities held by any of
them may be required by the court to produce such lists,
or a correct copy of them, or to permit their inspection.
The court may, upon cause shown, impound such lists or
copies and prescribe the terms upon which they may be
made available to the trustee, indenture trustee or any
creditor or stockholder. The court may refuse to permit
an inspection by a creditor or stockholder who acquired his
" Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 216.
100 Bankruptcy Act, See. 221. There is no indication in the Act as to
the "public policy" to be applied. In confirming a plan under 77B the
District Courts have in certain cases given consideration to the character
of the management of the new company. In re Anchor Post Fence Co.,
14 F. Supp. 801, 804 (D. C. Md. 1936) ; In re Parker-Young Co., 15 F. Supp.
965, 971 (D. C. N. H. 1936).
101 The application in practice of this provision will be extremely diffi-
cult. See: Texas Oils Securities Corp. v. Waco Development Co., 87 F.
(2d) 395 (C. C. A. 5th 1937) where it was held that under 77B the judge
had no power to disfranchise a creditor who, in contemplation of the re-
organization proceeding, acquired over one-third of the notes of the debtor
in order to have a veto upon reorganization plans.
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claim or stock within three months of the filing of the
petition.Y°
These provisions recognize the importance of lists of
security holders in a reorganization proceeding and broad-
en the power of the court to obtain such lists, to impound
them and to open them for inspection upon terms that it
may define. These sections appear to have been inspired
by experimental devices developed in the receivership pro-
ceedings of S. W. Straus & Co., Inc. by Justice Charles A.
Lockwood of New York.10 3 Prior to its receivership, S. W.
Straus & Co., Inc. had a virtual monopoly on lists of names
and addresses of persons to whom it had sold bonds which
enabled it to control the reorganizations of a great num-
ber of defaulted bond issues.104 In an effort to insure that
the lists were used for the benefit of all investors rather
than for the benefit of a dominant group, Judge Lockwood
developed a practice of denying access when it was not be-
lieved a proper use would be made of them. He indicated
that he would permit an applicant to obtain access to a list
upon showing (a) that he had a meritorious plan to sub-
mit to bondholders, or (b) that his objections to a proposed
plan were reasonable, or (c) that he desired to communi-
cate some matter of importance or advantage to bondhold-
ers. 0 5 In brief, in his treatment of the list problem, Jus-
tice Lockwood required lists of security holders to be closely
held and permitted their use only on the showing of a meri-
torious purpose.
ALLOWANCES
General authority is conferred upon the judge to allow
reasonable compensation to all parties in interest, includ-
102 Bankruptcy Act, Secs. 165, 166.
Supreme Court of the State of New York (King's County).
104 Report of the SEC on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activi-
ties, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees,
Pt. III, Committees for the Holders of Real Estate Bonds, issued June 3,
1936, Appendix C, p. 252.
"'People v. S. W. Straus & Co., Inc., N. Y. Law Journal (April 4, 1933)
at 1992; People v. S. W. Straus & Co., Inc., N. Y. Law Journal (February
7, 1934) at 650; People v. S. W. Straus & Co., Inc., N. Y. Law Journal (June
8, 1933) at 3459; People v. S. W. Straus & Co., Inc., N. Y. Law Journal
(September 30, 1933) at 1097; S. W. Straus & Co., Inc., N. Y. Law Journal
(February 26, 1934) at 951.
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ing indenture trustees, except the SEC, its attorneys and
agents.10 8 In fixing allowances for creditors and stockhold-
ers and their attorneys, "the judge shall give considera-
tion only to the services which contributed to the plan
confirmed or to the refusal of confirmation of a plan, or
which were beneficial in the administration of the estate,
and to the proper costs and expenses incidental there-
to' '.117 Chapter X establishes the right of individual credi-
tors and stockholders and their attorneys to allowances for
bona fide and useful services. 108 Protective committees,
representatives of security holders and others may be com-
pensated for services beneficial to the estate although a
plan is not approved or confirmed.0 9 Although the provi-
sions of Chapter X relating to allowances have been re-
ferred to as the "Christmas tree"110 provisions and have
been frequently attacked, it is submitted that the real pro-
tection of an estate from excessive allowances rests not
on a legal disqualification for compensation but on the
proper exercise of the control of the judge.
No compensation or reimbursement may be allowed to
any committee or attorney or other person acting in a rep-
resentative or fiduciary capacity who at any time, after
Bankruptcy Act, Secs. 241, 242.
10? Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 243.
108 Under 77B compensation was rarely allowed to individual security
holders and their attorneys although the power to do so was recognized.
National City Bank of N. Y. v. Soldona Crosas Realty Corp., 86 F. (2d)
923 (C. C. A. 1st 1936) ; In re Consolidated Motor Parts, 85 F. (2d) 579
(C. C. A. 2d 1936) ; In re Grocery Center, 83 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 7th
1936). See: West v. Fradenburg, et al., 86 F. (2d) 318 (C. C. A. 8th
1936; Teasdale v. Sefton Nat. Fibre Con. Co., 85 F. (2d) 379 (C. C. A. 8th
1936) ; In re A. Herz, Inc., 81 F. (2d) 511 (C. C. A. 7th 1936). Allowances
have been restricted to representatives of one committee for each class of
security holders. In re Paramount Publix Corp., 85 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A.
2d 1936), cert. denied Palmer v. Paramount Pictures, 300 U. S. 655, 81
L. ed. 865 (1937).
109 Compensation has been frequently refused for services rendered In
unsuccessful opposition to a plan that was confirmed. See: In re Clark &
Willow Streets Corp., 22 F. Supp. 666 (E. D. N. Y. 1938). Allowances
have been generally made for services in opposing successfully a plan with
the result another plan was adopted. In re Consolidated Motor Parts, 85
F. (2d) 579 (C. C. A. 2d 1936); In re Irving Austin Bldg. Corp., 22 F.
Supp. 583 (N. D. Ill. 1937). Under 77B an allowance has been denied for
services rendered on behalf of minority creditors in successfully opposing
on appeal a plan which had been confirmed by the district court. In re
Nine North Church St., 89 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 2d 1937), cert. denied Glass
& Lynch v. Nine North Church St., 302 U. S. 709, 82 L. ed. 22 (1937).
110 Senate hearings, p. 91.
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assuming to act in such capacity, has purchased or sold
claims or stock without the consent or approval of the
judge.'
CONCLUSION
In the past, the adoption of a reorganization plan has
rarely, if ever, been based on purely theoretical con-
siderations of "fairness." The problem of reorganiza-
tion has been fundamentally a struggle between conflicting
interests. The final solution has been largely the result of
the competition involved in private bargaining efforts of
the various parties whose interests have been at stake.
Prior to 77B, the matter was deemed one of private con-
tract attended by minimum judicial control, the power of
the court being limited to a veto power to declare a plan
inequitable because failing to provide for a relatively fair
offer to the different classes of security holders. Under
77B the underlying principle of the competitive process was
continued within the procedural channels of that act. Al-
though there were conspicuous exceptions, the limitations
of 77B were such that the tendency of the judge was not
to frustrate the purported wishes of a substantial number
in amount of security holders but rather to acquiesce in the
result of the private bargain conducted outside of court.112
The derivation of a reorganization through the operation
of this bargaining process is so deeply imbedded in our
thinking that it has been generally assumed without seri-
ous inquiry to be a sound, proper and indispensable system.
"I Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 249. This provision was anticipated by the
action of the court on allowances in In re Paramount Publix Corp., 12 F.
Supp. 823, 831, 832 (S. D. N. Y. 1935, Coxe D. J.) and In re Republic Gas
Corporation, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv., par. 4104 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
I's The theory that the working out of the plan under 77B is a matter
of private negotiation and that the court should review the result of the
negotiation, but should not participate therein, has been adopted by many
Federal judges. In Downtown Investment Co. v. Boston Metropolitan
Building, Inc., 81 F. (2d) 314, 321 (C. C. A. 1st 1936) the court not only
disapproved of any attempt by the judge to influence security holders In
favor of a plan, but stated that the judge should be greatly influenced on
the question of the fairness of the plan by the fact that It had been accepted
by the statutory majorities of the groups concerned. The court disap-
proved of the judge expressing an opinion upon the fairness of the plan
before It had been assented to by creditors. In support of the laissez faire
theory see: Lindley, L. J., In re English, Scottish and Australian Chartered
Bank (1893), 3 Ch. 385, 409. Compare remarks of Vaughan Williams, J.,
at p. 396 in the same case. See note 83, supra.
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The underlying principle of Chapter X is that the bar-
gaining process does not necessarily produce a reorgani-
zation plan which can stand such close scrutiny, judged by
ordinary standards of fairness, as to require the non-as-
senting minority to be bound by its provisions. The self-
interest of groups of security holders who are active par-
ticipants in the proceedings is so great that it is impossible
to expect them to press the assertion of proposals uncon-
ditioned by that interest. It is inevitable that a well or-
ganized, effectively represented class of security holders
influence the character of a plan to an extent out of pro-
portion to the influence of an inadequately organized or
ineffectively represented class. For the bargaining process
to operate successfully, each class of security holders is
required to be well organized and to be actively and ef-
fectively represented. The process presupposes independ-
ence of action among the groups representing different
classes of securities with conflicting interests. It presup-
poses that the assent of security holders to a plan repre-
sents a free and intelligent expression of opinion and that
in the final analysis the problem is one of private contract.
These ideal conditions rarely exist. The owners of the
equity in the property frequently have bought into the
outstanding bonds either for investment or in anticipation
of the reorganization proceedings, and a committee often
has a divided allegiance with its ability to act solely in the
interest of bondholders impaired. The SEC reported a
widespread practice for committees to be formed by the
corporation's investment bankers,, by the management of
the corporation or by the management and bankers in com-
bination. Frequently the security holders are not pre-
sented with a choice of plans but with a single plan cou-
pled with the untrue suggestion that the alternative is liqui-
dation. If the creditors are not effectively organized, the
debtor tends to occupy a dominant position with the not
infrequent result that secured and unsecured creditors are
induced to make sacrifices out of proportion to those of
stockholders. An equity in the property is not preserved
as contemplated by 77B and Chapter X; it is created.
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The initiation of a plan by the trustee, the requirement
of court approval prior to the submission of the plan to
creditors, the advisory report of the SEC and the greater
control conferred upon the judge drastically condition the
traditional bargaining process. As a result, a plan may
be formulated and considered free from the former pres-
sures of vocal parties in interest. The reorganization is
treated less as a matter of private bargain and more as an
abstract problem in the adjustment of conflicting equities,
and the solution is found less in struggle and more in criti-
cal and impartial analysis. On the other hand, there is
nothing in Chapter X to preclude the debtor, creditors and
other parties in interest from aggressively supporting or
opposing a plan formulated by the trustee or approved by
the court. The competitive process is limited, but it is not
eliminated.
